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NOTE
Affirmative Action for the Poor: A
Proposal for Affirmative Action in
Higher Education Based on
Economics, Not Race.
By KIMBERLY PAAP TAYLOR*
Introduction
Nearly thirty years ago, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964 in an effort to provide women and minorities with "equal opportu-
nity" in education and employment.' President Lyndon B. Johnson is-
sued Executive Order No. 11246 encouraging affirmative action
programs for women and minorities.2 Organizations instituted "tempo-
rary" preferential treatment plans aimed at achieving the goals of the
Civil Rights Act.' The creators of these programs did not envision that
the preferential programs would be permanent.4 They believed that af-
firmative action programs would provide education and employment ac-
cess for people who had been historically underrepresented and that
racial and gender inequality would be remedied. It is time to evaluate
the progress of current programs in order to reshape them or adopt new
ones.
Although many opportunities have opened up for minorities and
women over the past thirty years, racial or gender equality has yet to be
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1988, University of California at Berkeley.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2(a)(2), mandated an obligation to
provide equal opportunity.
2. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1340-43 (1991).
3. "Affirmative action, as envisioned by President Johnson in his famous Howard Uni-
versity speech in 1965 where he first put forward the idea, was a transition program. It was not
a permanent program. There is always a question of how long does that last." Steven A.
Holmes, The Nation; Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor Whites, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
18, 1991, at 3.
4. Id.
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achieved. The current affirmative action programs seem less "tempo-
rary" than first intended.5 In order to understand why these "tempo-
rary" programs are still entrenched, it is necessary to examine the
progress of the initial programs and assess the problems of American
society in the 1990s.
Statistics show that the percentage of Americans living in poverty
continues to grow.6 In 1990, 13.5% of Americans lived in poverty, up
from 12.8% in 1989. 7 This increase translates into an additional 2.1 mil-
lion people who fell below the poverty level in 1990.8 Timothy Smeeding
believes we are facing a permanent proportional decline of the middle
class.9 This belief is supported by the University of Michigan's Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, which reveals a decline in the middle class
into the "ranks of the poor."1 The gap between high and low wage
earners widened in the 1980s 1 as some of the middle class slid into lower
class status. It is time to create programs that will meet current demands
rather than maintaining programs that were aimed at the problems of the
1960s.
Recent studies show that affirmative action programs have helped to
establish a black middle class. 2 Certainly there is still progress to be
made with race-based affirmative action programs, but the current pro-
grams benefit middle-class blacks and largely ignore economically disad-
vantaged blacks who, because of their economic conditions, are the least
likely to succeed. 3 In 1978, William J. Wilson predicted a "transition
5. The label "affirmative action" has been used to describe several different types of pro-
grams with varied goals, most of which are based on the idea of preferential admissions or
hiring treatment for women and minorities. See Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Consti-
tution: Three Theories, 72 IowA L. Rnv. 281 (1987). Although preferential treatment pro-
grams have involved both women and minorities, this Note is limited to affirmative action
programs dealing with racial preferences.
6. The War on Poverty: Administrative Policy and Alternative Strategies, Hearings Before
the Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 305 (1991) (Statement of Stephen L.
Solarz, Representative).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Richard Morin, America's Middle Class Meltdown; While Few Escaped Poverty, More
Fell into It-and It's Getting Worse, WASH. PoSn, Dec. 1, 1991, at C1 (reporting on Professor
Smeeding's analysis of income data collected by the University of Michigan Panel Study on
Income Dynamics).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Dis-
advantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 646 (1992).
13. See America's Wasted Blacks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991; see also Judges, supra note
12, at 645-47. Judges suggests that affirmative action has contributed to the problems of the
economic underclass because the political focus remains on affirmative action rather than the
problems of the inner-city poor. Id
rWol. 20:805
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from racial inequalities to class inequalities."14 Since the early 1980s, our
society has become increasingly segregated along economic lines. 5
Commentators argue that the problems of the disadvantaged black com-
munity are more a function of class than of race, and the present affirma-
tive action programs, which provide preferential treatment based on race,
fail to address the problems of class inequality.16 While there is still pro-
gress to be made toward racial equality, commentators question whether
we should continue to provide preferential treatment to the sons and
daughters of people who were helped and have advanced because of af-
firmative action. 7 Several commentators have suggested affirmative ac-
tion programs based on economic or class distinctions.' 8 Such programs
would reach out to help those living in disadvantaged communities with
less emphasis on race-specific remedies. 19
This Note focuses on the goals and development of affirmative ac-
tion programs in higher education.2 ° Part I compares the social and
demographic problems of the 1960s with the social demographics of the
1990s. This part also reviews the commentaries on affirmative action
programs, evaluates the effectiveness of such programs, and discusses the
criticisms of affirmative action programs in higher education. Part II
examines the Equal Protection Clause and its implications for affirmative
action. The analysis focuses on Supreme Court decisions regarding af-
firmative action in the 1970s and 1980s. Part III is a proposal for federal
legislation that would mandate affirmative action programs based on eco-
14. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 3 (1978).
15. Ronald J. Ostrow, New Report Echoes 'Two Societies' Warning of 1968 Kerner Com-
mission, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1993, at A23. Ostrow quotes the recent findings of the Milton S.
Eisenhower foundation: "We conclude that the famous prophesy of the Kerner Commission,
of two societies, one black, one white--separate and unequal-is more relevant today than in
1968, and more complex, with the emergence of multiracial disparities and growing income
segregation." Idc
16. WILSON, supra note 14 at 150-51. Wilson contrasts the problems of inner city blacks:
poor job training, limited educational opportunity, and increased welfare dependency with the
improved situation for the members of the black middle class who are better educated and
enjoy greater employment opportunity.
17. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER 111 (1990); see also
Holmes, supra note 3, at 3.
18. Commentators suggesting that affirmative action should be based on economic criteria
include: Shelby Steele, William J. Wilson, Donald P. Judges, and Robert Greenstein.
19. Some commentators believe such a program will disproportionately target minorities.
See, eg., William Raspberry, The Black Underclass--Two Strategies, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
1991, at A9.
20. The nature of affirmative action in the workplace requires different remedies and is
often aimed at different goals. Although the constitutional analysis requires an examination of
the case law dealing with affirmative action in the workplace, this Note proposes legislation
limited to affirmative action programs for higher education.
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nomic criteria. Finally, Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of such
legislation.
I. History of Affirmative Action
The affirmative action programs instituted in the 1960s provided
more opportunities to minorities in the workplace and in education.21
But while affirmative action programs have contributed to the rise of the
African-American middle class, the percentage of African-American
families living in poverty has also increased dramatically.22
Critics of affirmative action in education have blamed the race-based
programs for creating "reverse discrimination" and for preferring "less
qualified" students.23 They contend that the social costs of affirmative
action have been borne by "innocent victims," primarily white men.24
Others feel the programs have created another form of discrimination
against African Americans, since preferential treatment has imposed a
stigma of questionable competence on African-American applicants. 25
Race-based affirmative action programs have become a divisive topic be-
tween liberals and conservatives and between African Americans and
whites.
Shelby Steele argues that the goals of affirmative action programs
should be two-pronged.26 One goal should be the economic development
of disadvantaged people, the second goal should be the eradication of
21. See Judges, supra note 12, at 645-46; Ronald Brownstein, Beyond Quotas; A New
Generation of Scholars is Stressing Class, Not Race, in an Effort to Break the Civil Rights Im-
passe, L.A. TIMES MAG., July 28, 1991, at 18. See generally STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS
OF AN AmRMATrIV ACTION BABY (1992).
22. See Judges, supra note 12, at 646.
IT]he proportion of black families with incomes over $35,000 grew from 15.7 percent
to 21.2 percent between 1970 and 1986 while the number of black families with in-
comes of more than $50,000 increased from 3.7 to 8.8 percent. During the same
period, the proportion of black families with incomes of less than $10,000 also grew
substantially from 28.8 percent to a staggering 30.2 percent.
Id. at 646 n.206 (citing Derek T. Dingle, An Agenda for the Black Middle Class, BLACK
ENTER., Nov. 1989, at 53, 55).
23. Institutions continue to measure their entrance criteria on standardized tests that have
been proven to discriminate on the basis of race and economic class. An analysis of the tests or
standards for admission to higher education is beyond the scope of this Note. But for com-
mentary on the subjectiveness and discriminatory nature of the objective entrance criteria, see
Brian Mikulak, Classism and Equal Opportunity: A Proposal for Affirmative Action in Educa-
tion Based on Economic Choice, 33 How. L.J. 113 (1990).
24. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims:
Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 793 n.8. But cf
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusT 148 (1980).
25. See STEELE, supra note 17, at 120.
26. Id. at 124.
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discrimination. Steele urges that racial preferences meet neither of these
goals, and that preferences for disadvantaged applicants be granted re-
gardless of race.27
The concept of affirmative action programs based on economic con-
ditions is appealing to both liberals and conservatives.2" Problems of the
inner city are becoming a political focus-people are ready to look at
possible solutions. The need to remedy the plight of all disadvantaged
Americans makes the time right for a shift in the goals and policies of
affirmative action.
II. Equal Protection and Affirmative Action
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."29 But "[t]he Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same."30 State and federal legislatures have
broad discretion to create classifications of persons under the law, as long
as the classification bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate state inter-
est.31 This is the "rational relation" test, the least strict level of judicial
scrutiny. Most stated government interests will suffice. Where a classifi-
cation is based on alienage, nationality or race, however, the classifica-
tion is considered "suspect." These "suspect classes" are examples of
"discrete and insular minorities,"3 2 and such legislation will be subject
to strict judicial review.33 In addition, any legislation which impinges on
the exercise of a fundamental right will also be strictly scrutinized.34
27. Steele writes:
Preferences [based on race] are inexpensive and carry the glamour of good inten-
tions-change the numbers and the good deed is done. To be against them is unkind.
But I think the unkindest cut is to bestow on children like my own an undeserved
advantage while neglecting the development of those disadvantaged children on the
East Side of my city who will never be in a position to benefit from a preference.
Give my children fairness; give disadvantaged children a better shot at develop-
ment-better elementary and secondary schools, job training, safer neighborhoods,
better financial assistance for college, and so on.
Id.
28. See Holmes, supra note 3, at 3.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147
(1940)).
31. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
32. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
33. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1970) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (nationality).
34. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 n.15. ("In determining whether a... denial of a particular
right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, we look to the Constitu-
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In Plyler v. Doe,35 the Supreme Court enumerated a third "interme-
diate" level of judicial review that is between the "rational basis" and
"strict scrutiny" tests and has been applied to classifications involving
gender and illegitimacy:3 6
[W]e have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification,
while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring con-
stitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have
sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judg-
ment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring
whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest
of the state.37
This level of judicial review, known as the intermediate level of scrutiny,
requires the state action be substantially related to an important govern-
ment interest.38
The germinal case on affirmative action in higher education is Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke.39 The Court in Bakke was
split four to four with no other justice joining Justice Powell's decision
for the Court. A plurality in Bakke stated that "[r]acial and ethnic dis-
tinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination."'  This has been called the "exacting
scrutiny" test, and is narrowly tailored to higher education.4 1
The claim in Bakke was one of reverse discrimination and the Court
struck down the University of California's affirmative action program.
Plaintiff Allan Bakke, a white male, sued the Medical School of the Uni-
versity of California at Davis and claimed that the school's special admis-
tion to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein."). This Note
will not deal with judicial review of legislation that infringes on a constitutionally enumerated
fundamental right. Although the Court agrees that education is a very important right, the
Court rejected the idea that education was a fundamental right in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
35. 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982).
36. See Jesse H. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial
Racial Classification: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IOWA L. REv. 255, 257 (1987).
Choper categorizes the different perspectives of the justices and writes that Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun consistently adhered to the "near strict scrutiny" requirement that
the legislation be "substantially related to an important state interest." Id. at 260. The current
makeup of the Court may be less inclined to use an intermediate level of scrutiny. See ELY,
supra note 24, and accompanying text.
37. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18.
38. Ia at 224.
39. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The first affirmative action case involving higher education to be
heard by the Supreme Court was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). By the time the
case went to the Supreme Court, however, DeFunis had finished law school and no longer had
standing.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
41. See O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 1343.
sions program had wrongfully discriminated against him when they
denied him admission to the medical school. 2 Bakke argued that the
program, which reserved sixteen of the one hundred openings in the class
for qualified "disadvantaged" minority students, excluded him from the
school solely because of his race and violated his equal protection
rights.4 3  The Court held that the special admission program created
racial distinctions and therefore was subject to strict judicial scrutiny.'
The Court rejected the University's argument that strict scrutiny should
not be applied in a claim of reverse discrimination since a white male is
not a member of a "discrete and insular minority"4 and does not require
protection from the political process. The Court stated that "[r]acial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination."" The plurality concluded that the
reservation of a specific number of positions was not necessary to meet
the state interest.47 In what has been hailed as "the most important part
of the decision for affirmative action programs in higher education,"4
Justice Powell wrote that while the "set-aside" violated equal protection,
race could be considered as a factor in the admissions process.49 Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun wrote separately to stress the "cen-
tral meaning" of the opinion: "Government may take race into account
when it acts.., to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial
prejudice."5"
The Bakke court found that "attainment of a diverse student body"
was clearly a "constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education."5  A university could take race into account during
the admissions process, but could not reserve a specific number of seats
without violating equal protection. 2 Justice Powell pointed to the
Harvard College admissions program which sought to admit a "diverse"
body of students;5 3 Harvard's definition of diversity included "students
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275-78.
43. Id at 277-78.
44. Id. at 291.
45. Id. at 290.
46. Id. at 291.
47. Id. at 319-20.
48. See Choper, supra note 36, at 257. The separate opinion by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, although not a majority, has been characterized as the test of inter-
mediate scrutiny.
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
50. Id at 325. This standard is different for education than for employment. See discus-
sion of notes 56-66, and accompanying text.
51. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
52. Id
53. Id at 317.
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from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups."54 Powell
stated that race could be considered a "plus" when it was considered in
light of all of the applicants qualifications,55 but a program that reserved
a specific number of positions for minority students showed a facial in-
tent to discriminate,56 and imposed burdens on individuals because of
their race.
Although the Court has not heard a case dealing with racial classifi-
cations in higher education since Bakke, the Court recently restated the
strict scrutiny standard for state and local affirmative action programs
based on racial classifications in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.57
The program in the Croson case was a city plan requiring prime contrac-
tors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contracts 8 to "Minority
Business Enterprises." In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court applied
heightened scrutiny and struck down the plan. Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor said that in the absence of proof of past discrimina-
tion59 in the City's construction industry, the City failed to demonstrate
a compelling interest justifying the plan.6' Absent a "compelling inter-
est," the City could not use racial classifications. 61 The Court held that
any plan aimed at remedying past discrimination had to be "narrowly
tailored" to its goal.62 O'Connor noted that the City had instituted a
rigid race-based quota63 without first attempting to use any race-neutral
means to increase minority business involvement. 64
O'Connor also compared the difference between the Court's defer-
ence to a federal legislative scheme, such as the Minority Business Enter-
prise (MBE) provision in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
54. Id. at 322.
55. Id. at 317-18.
56. Id.
57. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
58. Specifically, 30% of the dollar amounts of the contracts were to be awarded to Minor-
ity Business Enterprises. Id. at 469.
59. The stated absence of proof has been questioned by commentators. Although there
was no specific finding of discrimination, only two-thirds of one percent of municipal contracts
had been awarded to minority-owned businesses before the city's program was instituted. Pa-
tricia Williams, Legal Storytelling: The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 2128 (1989).
60. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 507.
63. Id. at 505.
64. Id at 509-10. O'Connor suggested that the City could provide financial assistance
and training, relax the bonding requirements, and simplify the bidding process in an effort to
provide race-neutral measures to open up the contracting market and remedy past societal
discrimination.
[Vol. 20:805
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and the Court's review of a city government plan.65 In Fulilove v.
Klutznik,66 the Supreme Court upheld a provision in the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977 which set aside ten percent of all federal funds
granted for public works projects to be paid to businesses owned or con-
trolled by statutorily identified minorities. Although Justice Burger
wrote in Fullilove that "it 'is not to say that we "defer" to the judgement
of Congress... on a constitutional question,' "Burger acknowledged the
difference between a plan made by "a single judge or school board" and
"a considered decision of the Congress and the President. '67 More re-
cently, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the Court held that federal
law using racial classifications would not be subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny and the Court applied the intermediate level of scrutiny.68 Thus, the
Court has acknowledged the difference between its review of local or
state plans and its review of legislative programs passed by Congress.
III. Proposal for Affirmative Action Programs Based on
Economic or Class Distinctions
Based on the assumption that the problems of African Americans
and other minorities are "more a function of class than race"69 and will
not be solved by "race-specific" affirmative action programs, 70 a growing
number of commentators are proposing an affirmative action program
65. Id. at 487.
66. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
67. Id. at 473.
68. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
69. Brownstein, supra note 21, at 18. Brownstein credits a group of scholars and political
analysts, that he calls the "Synthesis School" thinkers, with the idea that whites and minorities
must coalesce to solve the problems of race relations. Brownstein's Synthesis School includes
both liberals and conservatives, professors, and writers. Brownstein includes conservative San
Jose State English professor Shelby Steele; liberal University of Chicago sociologist William J.
Wilson; Washington Post columnist William Raspberry; and Robert Greenstein, director of the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, in this group. Id
Brownstein contrasts the Synthesis School ideas with the African-American conservative
philosophy; as an example he points specifically to Clarence Thomas, who supports minimal
government assistance to help the poor. In comparison, the Synthesis School thinkers support
a total government commitment toward the disadvantaged, without regard to race. Id.
The Synthesis School approach is fashioned on two basic assumptions. The first is that
the problems of minorities today are more a function of class than of race. To combat these
problems, William J. Wilson proposes "race-neutral programs such as full employment strate-
gies, job-skills training, comprehensive health care, reforms in the public schools, child care
legislation and prevention of crime and drug abuse." Id.
The second premise of the Synthesis School is that to elect a political coalition capable of
instituting broad reform, liberals must be able to attract both the minority vote and middle and
low-income white votes. Id.
70. Race-specific programs are those that provide preferential treatment to applicants
solely on the basis of race. See generally WILLIAM J. WiLsoN, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED
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that would be "race-neutral. '71  A program based on race-neutral crite-
ria would be aimed at providing opportunity to economically disadvan-
taged applicants. "Race-neutral" or "condition-oriented" programs
could target social conditions such as undereducation and joblessness72
that are common to inner-city poverty. Factors to be considered for
admission would include the applicant's income, the family's socioeco-
nomic status, and the parents' level of educational attainment. Critics of
race-neutral programs contend that such programs are an attempt to "re-
treat from.., remedying racial discrimination. '7 3 By contrast, critics of
current affirmative action programs argue that such programs help mid-
dle-income African-Americans, but are less likely to help applicants who
most need the help-the inner-city poor.74
Commentators fear that "the growing concentration of Americans
in the high and low income ranges threatens to further exacerbate class
and racial animosities.",7" As the disparity widens between the "haves
and have nots," the correlation between economics and opportunity is
easier to see.76 Recent studies show a relationship between socioeco-
nomic status and educational attainment.77 An upper-middle income
student is far more likely to attend college if the student's parents at-
tended college and she has financial support.78 In comparison, a low-
income student is less likely to apply to college if neither of her parents
have gone to school and there is little family support.7 9
Furthermore, an affliative action program based on race-neutral
criteria could achieve cultural and economic diversity better than a pro-
gram aimed only at creating racial diversity. Clyde Summers laments
(1987) (arguing that race-specific policies do little to help disadvantaged African Americans
and as a result ignore the issues of racial dominance).
71. See Brownstein, supra note 21, at 18.
72. Raspberry, supra note 19, at A9.
73. Holmes, supra note 3, at 3.
74. See Judges, supra note 12, at 645.
75. WILSON, supra note 14, at 21.
76. See generally Mikulak, supra note 23.
77. Compare id. at 117 with Christopher Jencks, Is the American Underclass Growing?, in
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 69 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., (1991)) (finding that
parental education mattered less among African-American students. "Among teenagers who
finished high school during the 1970s or early 1980s an extra year of parental education had
only two-thirds as much effect on blacks as on whites.... The declining effect of family
background on black educational attainment is precisely the opposite of what the underclass
hypothesis predicts.").
78. In fact, an applicant may receive preferential admissions treatment if he or she is a
child of an alumnus. See Mikulak, supra note 23, at 120. A study of Princeton University
acceptance rates revealed an acceptance rate of 48% for children of alumni compared to the
overall acceptance rate of 17%. Id. at 120 n.28.
79. Id.
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the lack of economic diversity in his law school classes at the University
of Pennsylvania: "I have almost no students whose parents are union
members and very few students who come from what you would call the
blue-collar working class .... What that means is that no one has any
idea what life is like on the other side of the tracks.""0 William J. Wilson
argues that the departure of middle-class African Americans from the
cities to the suburbs has left the urban underclass isolated from role mod-
els of economic opportunity.81 Unlike communities where there is eco-
nomic integration, inner-city ghettos are isolated from economic
opportunities. Such isolation makes it difficult for low-income African
Americans to improve their situation. A study conducted by James Ro-
senbaum and Susan Popkin confirms Wilson's argument of the impor-
tance of role models that encourage work and social institutions, such as
schools, churches, stores, and recreational facilities.82 The study in-
volved a group of people from the inner city who moved to the suburbs.83
The group in the suburbs was compared with a group remaining in the
inner city, and the study compared the effects of residential integration.
Factors such as job-availability and safety contributed to the increase in
work hours among the new suburban residents.84 The results of the
study suggest that economically integrated communities provide more
meaningful economic opportunities than isolated urban ghettos to low-
income individuals. Rosenbaum's study has resulted in a Chicago pro-
gram which provides rent subsidies to encourage low-income families in
the inner city to move into Chicago's suburbs.85 In addition, affirmative
action programs based on socioeconomic factors might help to erode the
class animosities by providing exposure to people of different economic
and cultural backgrounds.
The concept of an affirmative action program that classifies appli-
cants on the basis of economic status has been discussed by many com-
mentators,8 6 but has yet to be put in practice. This Note proposes one
application of an economic-based affirmative action program: federal
80. Holmes, supra note 3, at 3 (quoting Clyde Summers). Summers further notes "[t]hat
[uniformity of the student body] leads to a very sterile discussion when it comes to labor law."
Id.
81. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 138.
82. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J.Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low Income
Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 77, at
355.
83. Id at 347.
84. Id. at 352.
85. Louis Freedberg, Urban Blacks Find New Hope, and Pain, in Suburbs, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 22, 1993, at Al.
86. See Brownstein, supra note 21, at 18.
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legislation that would require all public universities to change their af-
firmative action programs to focus on providing educational opportuni-
ties to the economically disadvantaged.
A race-based affirmative action program without more can only off-
set the effects of facial discrimination. But if students grew up in an
economically disadvantaged neighborhood where the schools did not of-
fer the same opportunities or training as an economically advantaged
neighborhood, the students will still be at a disadvantage when they are
expected to compete with the students from the advantaged schools.
Often students from the inner-city schools will not have had the same
resources as the students who attended school in a more advantaged
area. Rather than providing preferential treatment based on race, an af-
firmative action program based on socioeconomic factors would evaluate
the relative need of each applicant. A program aimed at assisting the
economically disadvantaged might disproportionately target minority ap-
plicants," but such a program would more effectively address the needs
of the economic underclass, specifically undereducation and jobless-
ness.88 In addition, such programs may be more likely to garner support
from critics of race-based affirmative action programs since they would
not discriminate on the basis of race.
Although Justice Powell argued in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez that it was difficult to identify a distinct class of
"poor,"'8 9 it is possible to identify an economically disadvantaged appli-
cant using a variety of factors. Colleges and universities are comfortable
analyzing such information since they gather it to determine financial
aid.9" In addition to considering an applicant's income or family income,
a program should also look to the level of educational attainment by fam-
ily members of the applicant.
Current race-based admissions programs often do very little to actu-
ally provide "equal opportunity" to students. An applicant who is ad-
mitted on the basis of his or her race may be given the "opportunity" of
admittance. If the applicant has not had an elementary and high school
education equal to that of the average applicant, however, the student
will need additional assistance in order to have a meaningful opportunity
87. See Judges, supra note 12, at 684.
88. In order to most effectively improve the academic opportunities for inner-city chil-
dren, changes are needed at the elementary school level. For a discussion of educational fi-
nance remedies see Judges, supra note 12, at 689-714.
89. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973).
90. See Mikulak, supra note 23, at 124-25.
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to compete.91 Affirmative action programs offering preferential treat-
ment to those from disadvantaged backgrounds would necessarily have
to provide some remedial assistance. If the school can supplement the
curriculum to provide some of the training that "advantaged" students
received earlier in their education, the student may be able to better com-
pete with the other students. In the best-case scenario, the school can
provide students with the necessary tools to develop skills. As a result,
they could be given an "equal opportunity" to compete.
IV. Constitutional Analysis of Legislation Mandating
Preferential Treatment Based on Economic Criteria
Critics of an affirmative action program based on economic criteria
will argue that such a program is merely a proxy for a program based on
racial preferences. While the analysis of the underclass is inconclusive as
to its ethnic composition, commentators believe it is disproportionately
made up of minorities.9" Even if a condition-oriented program were to
provide preferential treatment predominately to minority applicants,
such a program would be aimed at remedying problems such as jobless-
ness and undereducation which are certainly within the government's in-
terest to pursue.
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a law that is
"neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the
government to pursue" is not invalid simply because it affects a greater
proportion of one race than another.9 The Washington Court was faced
with a qualifying test for police officers in the District of Columbia.
Plaintiffs argued that the written test discriminated against African
Americans since the test excluded a disproportionate number of African-
American applicants. The Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins94 for the
proposition that a facially neutral statute cannot be applied to invidiously
discriminate on the basis of race.9" Disproportionate impact alone, how-
ever, does not mean that the Court must apply strict scrutiny in its re-
view of the law. The Court noted that the differential racial effect of the
policy warranted further inquiry, but felt that the test was sufficiently
91. As Professor Michel Rosenfeld notes, "[e]quality of opportunity for any given mem-
ber of a designated class often depends on something besides the removal of the obstacles faced
by all members of that class." Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity:
A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1689 (1986).
92. Judges, supra note 12, at 684.
93. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
94. 188 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating discriminatory city licensing requirements aimed at
Chinese-owned laundries).
95. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
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related to the training program to negate an inference of racial
discrimination.96
An affirmative action program based on economic criteria would be
aimed at chronic problems that plague the inner-city poor, such as un-
dereducation, joblessness, and insufficient job training. Despite a possi-
ble disproportionate effect on minority applicants, the Court would likely
find that the economic preferences are sufficiently aimed at remedying
the stated goals to negate the inference of racial discrimination.
If the Court were to find that a program based on economic criteria
was a proxy for a race-based program, an economic program would
likely survive strict scrutiny. Justice Powell indicated in Bakke that it is
often appropriate to judge an applicant on non-traditional standards.97
The institution can then examine a wide array of factors, including race,
to determine an applicant's eligibility. In the interest of admitting a di-
verse student body,98 the college can recruit students who have the abil-
ity to succeed, but would seem underqualified based only on traditional
admissions criteria. So long as an affirmative action program based on
economic criteria did not designate a certain number of seats that would
be filled only by affirmative action applicants, the Court would likely find
that such a program met the requirements set forth in Bakke.
Although it is often suggested that the underclass constitutes an
identifiable class and should be considered a suspect class for purposes of
judicial scrutiny,99 the Supreme Court rejected this argument in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez."° In Rodriguez, the
plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of elementary school children
from poor families.1"' They claimed that the state's reliance on local
property taxation for school funding violated the poor children's equal
protection interests because of the disparity in the funds that were pro-
vided to the local schools from the local property taxes. While the dis-
trict court considered poverty to be a "suspect classification" and
education to be a fundamental right,"0 2 the court held that the funding
system would be upheld only upon a showing of a compelling state
96. Id. at 247.
97. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
98. Attainment of a diverse student body is a "constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education." AL. at 312-13.
99. See Judges, supra note 12, at 620-23.
100. 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
101. Id at 5.
102. The Court rejected the argument that education was a fundamental right in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See supra note 34 for a discussion of fundamental
rights and equal protection.
interest. 103
The Supreme Court overturned the district court in an opinion by
Justice Powell and rejected the district court's determination of wealth as
a suspect class.1"' Justice Powell noted that under the facts there was no
"definitive description" or "delineation of the disfavored class."105 The
cases in which wealth was treated as a suspect class involved the rights of
indigents in criminal trials. In the limited situations where the Court has
considered wealth a suspect class,"06 the benefit that an individual was
deprived of was, typically, a fundamental right."7
In Rodriguez, the Court found "[an] absence of any evidence that
the financing system discriminates against any definable category of
'poor' "."18 The Court pointed to the lack of characteristics of a clearly
definable class, and the lack of immutability of conditions when it denied
suspect class status.'0 9 It is unlikely that the current Court would find
that an admissions process that treated people differently because of their
relative wealth created a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny. The
trend on the Rehnquist Court has been to limit suspect classifications to
race and nationality.' In his book Democracy and Distrust, Professor
John Hart Ely notes that "the once glittering crusade to extend special
constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a rout."11
Ely argues that the Court's role should be to protect groups of peo-
103. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18.
104. Id
105. Id.
106. See generally Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
107. Where the Court has considered wealth a suspect class it has pointed to two distinct
requirements: (1) because of her impecunity the individual was completely unable to pay for
some desired benefit, and (2) as a result, the loss of the benefit resulted in an absolute depriva-
tion of the individual's interest. Specifically, in Griffln v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the "ben-
efit" was the ability to acquire a court transcript for use during the appellate process. The lack
of the use of the transcript was held to interfere with the appellant's right to a fair trial.
108. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25.
109. kd
110. ELY, supra note 24, at 148.
111. Id. Ely notes that poverty is "theoretically" an escapable condition. See id, at 150.
Ely argues that a child who grows up in near poverty has very little chance to change his or
her opportunities until long after the damage has been done. If a child is never entitled to
choose to go somewhere other than the inner-city schools, she may never be exposed to higher
levels of academic material. The applicant may have excelled at her high school, but the quali-
fications may still be well below those of applicants from more competitive high schools. Chil-
dren of more economically privileged backgrounds generally receive more material help from
their parents. In addition, parents, friends, and siblings may provide role models which better
reflect those individuals who make up the economically privileged class. See Mikulak, supra
note 23, at 123-24, for statistics and scores from applicants of varied socioeconomic
backgrounds.
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pie that cannot protect themselves politically. 112 He believes the Court
need not protect against "reverse discrimination," since the majority will
adequately protect its own interests. Rather, the role of the Court should
be to protect the "discrete and insular minorities" whose political repre-
sentation is inadequate. 13 Very few economically disadvantaged people
are part of our government's power structure. As a result, the rights of
the poor may easily be subjugated to the interests of the economically
advantaged majority.
Commentators argue that the Court should consider the poor a sus-
pect class and apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.114 If the Court
were to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to a program classifying
applicants based on their economic standing, the program would be up-
held upon the finding of a substantial state interest. The Court would
likely find a substantial state interest in the need to remedy the problems
of the economically disadvantaged. A program aimed at providing equal
educational opportunity to disadvantaged individuals would serve the
state interest in remedying joblessness, undereducation, and drug abuse.
The Court would likely find that the state has a substantial interest in
such goals.
However, if the Court was to reverse its holding in Rodriguez and
hold that the conditions of the underclass warrant suspect status, it is
likely that the Court would be faced with the familiar claims of reverse
discrimination. An applicant would argue that a program based on eco-
nomic conditions would discriminate against other applicants solely on
the basis of their wealth. If the underclass was considered a suspect
class, a court would be required to apply a higher level of scrutiny to
such a program. Where the Court has applied heightened levels of scru-
tiny, the scrutiny has been applied alike for men and women, and for
whites and blacks. The Court has rejected Ely's argument that the role
of the Court is to protect countermajoritarian interests. Those who ar-
gue that the poor should be considered a suspect class should be aware
that the Court's symmetrical application of heightened scrutiny could
result in the protection of a wealthy applicant who claims to be discrimi-
nated against by the program. While it seems unlikely that a court
would apply intermediate scrutiny and invalidate such a program to pro-
tect advantaged applicants, the Court would be departing from its cur-
112. ELY, supra note 24, at 152-53. This argument is based on the famous Carolene Prod-
ucts footnote four, which discusses "discrete and insular minorities." United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
113. Id. at 150.
114. See Judges, supra note 12, at 620-23.
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rent course if it did not apply the intermediate scrutiny equally to claims
from wealthy applicants and poor applicants.
If the Court were to follow its current course, the lowest level of
judicial review would be applied to legislation that classifies people on the
basis of economic criteria. If the Court applied the "rational relation"
test, it would undoubtedly find that Congress has a legitimate govern-
ment interest in remedying the problems of the underclass and that legis-
lation designed to provide educational opportunities to the economically
disadvantaged was rationally related to such an interest.
Conclusion
Critics of affirmative action programs contend that preferential
treatment programs have created a stigma that minority applicants are
less qualified and admitted only because of their race.11 Ideally, a race-
neutral program would reduce the stigma that has attached to affirmative
action programs. Many people of color have had to tolerate assumptions
that all minority students in higher education have been admitted
through "special admissions" programs based on lower standards. In
reality, only a portion of minority applicants apply through affirmative
admissions programs. 116
While proponents of an economically based program believe that
such a program would not carry the same stigma as those programs that
are based solely on race,117 others disagree. Janice Austin, Director of
Admissions for Hastings College of the Law, questions whether or not a
program based on race-neutral policies would truly reduce the stigma.11
If the program was largely made up of people of color, Austin believes
that the same generalizations and resulting stigma may occur.I19
A program based on economic factors would do a better job recruit-
ing able applicants from less advantaged backgrounds. The "truly disad-
vantaged" include the inner-city poor and as commentators suggest, they
are disproportionately African American.12 ° As a result, an affirmative
115. See, e.g., RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY ch. 5 (1982).
116. The facts of Regents of University of California v. Bakke show that over a four year
period from 1971 to 1974, 63 minority students were admitted to University of California at
Davis Medical School through the special admissions process, while 44 minority students were
admitted to the medical school through the regular admissions process. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
276.
117. See Raspberry, supra note 19, at A9.
118. Interview with Janice Austin, Director of Admissions, Hastings College of the Law, in
San Francisco, Cal. (January 23, 1992).
119. Id.
120. See Raspberry, supra note 19, at A9.
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action program based on economic factors may ultimately target minor-
ity applicants. An empirical study is warranted to examine whether a
program based on economic criteria would disproportionately affect
minorities.
Regardless, a program based on economics is likely to garner both
multi-racial and bipartisan congressional support. 1 21 Whites and African
Americans alike would have the same opportunity to receive preferential
treatment given the same disadvantaged status. As a result, affirmative
action might become a less divisive issue between African Americans and
whites.
An affirmative action program will have a discriminatory impact on
some people, and those people can be expected to challenge the program.
An affirmative action program based on socioeconomic criteria, however,
is likely to escape strict scrutiny by the Court. An affirmative action
program aimed at providing more opportunities to individuals of lower
socioeconomic status will be more likely to help remedy the problems of
the inner-city poor-joblessness, drug abuse, and undereducation-and
would be better suited to meet the current needs of American society in
the 1990's.
While the ideal program will reach out to disadvantaged applicants
without regard to race, there is still enough evidence of racial inequality
and interracial animosity to support the proposition that race should not
be totally excluded as a factor. According to Ken Lloyd, Dean of Ad-
missions at the University of San Francisco, such a program is not a new
idea for law school admissions. 12 2 In 1969, the American Bar Associa-
tion mandated that law school admissions offices establish a program to
recruit applicants from underrepresented backgrounds to better prepare
lawyers to serve underrepresented communities.
123
An example of a working program of this type is the Legal Equal
Opportunity Program (LEOP) at Hastings College of the Law. The
LEOP program is self-nominating. 124 An applicant decides if she has
been disadvantaged due to race, prior education, gender, economics, or
any other factors. The applicant must write a separate essay for the ap-
plication that explains her disadvantage, and the application will be read
by Hastings LEOP students. A minority student who does not nominate
121. Paul Gardner, Democrats Must Shift to Policies Helping All Needy Americans, CHRIS-
TIAN Sm. MoNIToR, Sept. 3, 1991, at 18.
122. Interview with Ken Lloyd, Dean of Admissions, University of San Francisco, in San
Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 9, 1992).
123. Id.
124. Interview with Hilda Taylor, former Director of the Hastings LEOP Program, in San
Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 8, 1991).
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herself for consideration by the LEOP program will be considered in the
general admissions program. The LEOP program includes a wide range
of students of both white and minority backgrounds. The disadvantaged
circumstances of those in the program include economic disadvantages,
physical abuse, learning disabilities, and race. If race is one of several
factors included in the criteria for consideration, then critics of the pro-
gram should not see a change in amffrmative action as a "retreat from
remedying discrimination." '125 The benefit of this program is that it
targets all applicants who have been disadvantaged in any way. The
goals of the program are two-fold: to recruit a diverse student body and
to give an applicant who has the ability to compete in higher education
the necessary tools to compete. 126 The LEOP program shows that these
kinds of factors are not too difficult to consider.
Although the American Bar Association mandate has encouraged
law schools to alter their admissions criteria, similar types of programs
should be instituted in higher education admissions. The ABA's effort to
open opportunities in the legal profession to underrepresented communi-
ties applies equally to undergraduate universities and other graduate pro-
grams. Individuals from disadvantaged or underrepresented
communities that are given better opportunities in education could pro-
vide role models in their communities and may be more likely to assist
and serve their communities.
125. See Holmes, supra note 3, at 3.
126. Taylor, supra note 124.
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